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Public disclosure and actional legitimacy: Evidence from WFP's operations in 
Nepal’s earthquake affected community  
 
Abstract:  
 
This paper investigates how a global humanitarian NGO, World Food Program (WFP), struggled to maintain its 
legitimacy in response to crisis regarding the distribution of rotten food among earthquake victims in Nepal in mid-2015. 
Through thematic analysis of news media articles and WFP’s disclosure documents, and relevant reports released by the 
Nepalese government and human rights organisations, the study finds that while WFP put emphasis on the promise of 
future commitment as part of its actional legitimation process, it took a strong defensive approach, with a limited 
responses regarding current action s. The paper contributes by providing insight in an operational level  that an 
organisational action in a disaster affected community will remain ineffective until proper coordination with local 
stakeholders including the local government and community members is fully developed.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the increased economic and social significance research focusing on non-governmental 
organisations’ (NGOs) accountability and legitimacy is growing (Ryan et al., 2014; Kreander et al., 
2009; Salamon et al., 2007; Burt, 2007) because of their increased economic and social significance. 
Prior research on NGOs and public sector organisations highlights NGOs’ complementary role to 
government, to society, and to make public sectors accountable through social movements (Burt, 
2007; Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007; Haack et al., 2012; Dubuisson-Quellier, 2013; Kraeger, 2010). 
There is also growing research on NGOs and public sector organisations in relation to their 
accountability, legitimacy, and responsiveness towards social and environmental management, 
performance measurement, governance as a response to wider stakeholders’ pressures (for examples 
Andreava et al., 2014;  Gurd, 2013; Clegg & Gordon, 2012; Morris and Ogden, 2011; Valentinov, 
2011; Chang, 2006; Dixon et al., 2006; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006; Ebrahim, 2003; Edwards and 
Hulme, 1995; Sinclair, 1995). Much of this research has investigated legitimacy and its relation to 
power, and explored how stakeholder power (both internal and external) influence the construction of 
legitimacy within the organisations which are going through legitimation crisis.  Moreover, some 
studies specifically looked at  the relationship between state’s and NGO’s role for anti-poverty 
advocacy activities (Davis, 2009); and  government’s accountability  for protecting citizens or 
community from natural disasters (Newberry, 2016; Sciulli, 2015; Newhouse, 2015; Eikenberry et 
al., 2007).  
However, little is known about how NGOs or international non-governmental organisations’ (IGOs) 
legitimacy and accountability is conveyed during their crisis time. In particular, there is a lack of 
research, in context of a developing country, which investigated the link between organisational 
legitimacy and the crisis that occurs during a disaster response, and whether and how this affects the 
overall development of disaster affected communities. This paper aims to address the research gaps 
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by investigating whether and how WFP responded to its operational crisis occurred within the 
Nepalese earthquake affected communities where I/NGO sector appears a  powerful entity; and how 
this response approach effected the overall NGO sector and the development of the local community. 
Disaster recovery is a challenging process for both government and NGOs. If an organisation fails to 
encounters a crisis in the disaster recovery process due to its own poor community services to the 
victims, its legitimacy would be challenged by the broader stakeholder groups. When two big 
earthquakes (the first one was a 7.8 magnitude according to a U.S. Geological Survey followed by 
hundreds of aftershocks) hit Nepal on and after the 25th of April 2015, national and international 
communities began assisting the victims. The devastating disaster claimed 8,898 people’s lives, 
injured 22,309 people, and damaged around a million houses, both fully and partially (Government 
of Nepal, 2015b). The Nepal government, international governments, INGOs including bilateral and 
multilateral agencies, and thousands of individuals came together in response to support victims of 
the disaster (Burket et al., 2015). One of the significant responses was food and accommodation 
assistance from many organisations, such as United Nations including World Food Program (WFP), 
Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Save the Children, Oxfam, International Red Cross, and many others. 
However, maintaining the quality of services being provided by I/NGOs was a challenging task that 
would require care, otherwise the legitimacy and accountability of their actions will be questioned by 
stakeholders. That’s what happened in Nepal when many I/NGOs’, primarily WFP, disaster response 
operations were critically questioned because of poor quality services. WFP, the case for this study, 
faced an organisational crisis in relation to its distribution of rotten food among earthquake affected 
people. Hence, by exploring the case of WFP, the authors of this paper discuss whether and how 
WFP tried to reclaim their legitimacy, when it was being challenged by its stakeholders; and what 
were the consequences , if any, of this legitimacy re-claim both during and after the 2015 Nepal 
catastrophe.  
By focusing on publicly available documents on the WFP crisis, including news articles, government 
reports, NGOs’ documents and WFP’s reports and press releases, this article shows that an 
international humanitarian agency (WFP) seemed to undertake a defensive legitimacy strategy, 
including dominating its stakeholders, to handle the crisis. There was a tension as local stakeholders 
voiced against WFP for its perceived lack of accountability and coordination for victims’ food safety 
of the disaster stricken community. The paper contributes by providing insights in both operational 
and policy level. In operational level, an organisational action in a disaster affected community will 
remain ineffective until proper coordination with local stakeholders including the local government 
and community members is fully developed. In policy level, both NGOs and developing countries 
such as Nepal need to work on the model that addresses the power tensions between IGOs and 
stakeholders in implementing humanitarian policies.  
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of WFP’s operational 
crisis in Nepal. Section 3 discusses the concept of actional legitimacy and how this is relevant to 
solving a crisis related to an organisation’s activities. Section 4 highlights the research methods used 
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for this study. The section 5 elaborates on the analysis and results, and the final section includes 
discussions and conclusion of the study.  
 
2. WFP and its operational crisis in Nepal 
Established in 1961, WFP “the food aid arm of the United Nations system” is the leading 
organisation in the world for food support, working with the “objective of eradicating hunger and 
poverty” (www.wfp.org/about/mission-statement).  Working together with its sister organisation, 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), other UN organisations, government and 
local partners, WFP pursues “a vision of the world in which every man, woman and child has access 
at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life” (WFP, 2015a). By November 2015, it 
operates in 75 countries around the world, including Nepal, reaches more than 80 million people via 
food assistance, and employs 11,500 staff. 
WFP has been operating in Nepal for more than 50 years targeting the improvement of the socio-
economic status of different regional areas in assisting government of Nepal. Its activities range from 
nutrition and education to supporting people’s livelihoods, particularly on vulnerable communities, 
including pregnant women and nursing mothers, young and school aged children (Bradford, 2015). 
After Nepal’s earthquake in April 2015, WFP was engaged in the distribution of food among victims 
of the earthquake affected communities. However, the operational crisis began when the food 
distributed by WFP were found to be rotten, black and smelt foul, and were unsuitable for 
consumption (see Amnesty International, 2015; Middlenton, 2015; Sharma, 2015; The Kathmandu 
Post, 2015e). The substandard food was first identified in the Nuwakot district where WFP had 
distributed 1,478 quintal rice in coordination with Red Cross (Adhikari, 2015a). A similar incident 
occurred in Kavre district where the eating of low quality food caused diarrhoea among children 
(The Kathmandu Post, 2015a; NHRC, 2015). The issue became more serious when damaged rice 
was distributed on a larger scale again in Gorkha district, one of the highly affected areas of 
earthquake (The Kathmandu Post, 2015b; Republica, 2015a; The Himalayan Times, 2015a). In 
addition to this, the godwon of WFP in the regional centre of the mid-western part of Nepal was 
found to have huge amounts of low quality food items stored. Most of the issues were revealed when 
the local people (beneficiaries) disclosed pictures and videos of low quality food via telephone, 
social media (Facebook) and in person; and different monitoring teams reported on these issues 
(Adhikari, 2015b; Sangroula, 2015a; The Kathmandu Post, 2015a, 2015b, 2015e). 
In the next section, a brief discussion on the concept of actional legitimacy will be provided to 
analyse and interpret the overall WFP crisis in Nepal.  
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3. The concept of actional legitimacy: 
Legitimacy logic suggests that organisational values are congruent with the values and norms of the 
society in which the organisation operates (Islam, 2015; Zhao, 2012; Islam & Deegan, 2008; Deegan, 
2002; Suchman, 1995; Lindblom, 1994). An organisation is legitimate if it is perceived by the public 
as responsible to the community (Boyd, 2000). Focussing on general legitimacy, which deals with 
constitutive belief based on the expectations of external institutions (Suchman, 1988; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1987) scholars argue that 
organisations that act in an inconsistent way with the values and norms of society are illegitimate and 
face potential disruption to their continued operations (Boyd, 2000; Suchman, 1995).  
 
In general, legitimacy concept asserts that if organisations lose their legitimacy due to any threats or 
crisis, they try to regain it through different means. These perceived threats against legitimacy should 
lead to responsive actions in different context (time, nation, culture etc) (Islam & Deegan, 2008; 
Deegan, 2002) to regain its legitimacy by using different means such as disclosures or 
communication of information. When they are given pressure from external powerful stakeholders to 
legitimise their operations they might respond differently (Oliver, 1991; Chang, 2006). These 
responses could be from conforming to resistant, passive to active, preconscious to controlling, 
impotent to influential, and habitual to opportunistic (Oliver, 1991; Chang, 2006). The degree of 
legitimacy of any organisations are generally decided by people as per public interests (Valentinov, 
2011).  
 
However, while prior research largely discussed legitimacy logics as a framework to explain 
corporate social and environmental disclosures (see for example Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Patten, 
1992; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995;  Islam & Deegan, 2008;), there is a lack of research to 
investigate how NGOs use legitimacy logics as a response to crisis. Such crisis of NGOs may be 
related to an action or an operation or a policy, and legitimising it as a response to a crisis can be 
termed ‘actional legitimacy’. Indeed, this paper focuses particularly on the same notion of actional 
legitimacy (Boyd, 2000) to fulfil the void in the research. The concept of actional legitimacy deals 
with specific organisational actions rather than an entire organisation’s operating practices. Ulrich 
(1995) explained it as an organisation’s ability to provide good reasons for its actions. Boyd, (2000) 
argues that when actional legitimacy is carried out responsibly and appropriately, it helps to achieve 
an organisation’s goals and generates public trust. Thus, the notion of actional legitimacy opens up 
the possibility for organisations to be proactive in getting support from the public before, during or 
after any crisis.  
 
When organisations face a crisis, they seek explanations for them or pledge prevention of further 
incidents and communicate with key stakeholders that might assist organisations create or re-
establish legitimation for their operation (Hearit, 1995; Boyd, 2000). Organisations either defend 
themselves or use apologia to repair obvious mistakes as part of re-legitimacy (Williams & 
Treadaway, 1992; Boyd, 2000). The strength of actional legitimacy is that it occurs when public 
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dialogue can still influence organisational actions, thereby, the legitimation from people can play a 
role in organisations’ future policy formation (Boyd, 2000).  
There is a strong connection between actional (Boyd, 2000) and general legitimacy (Lindblom, 1994) 
as the former might lead to the latter. Actional legitimacy matters at a micro level whereas general 
legitimacy at a macro level (Boyd, 2000). For any organisations, actional legitimacy seems quite 
important as it deals with an organisation’s policies or activities in a particular region. Furthermore, 
dealing with one mini-crisis could be easier and less costly for the organisations. However, when 
organisations fail to obtain legitimacy for an action, it might lead to a major crisis, and then obtaining 
actional legitimacy for all activities might be necessary (Boyd, 2000). The worst case is that an 
organisation does not deal with a crisis involving one policy or action, which leads to the risk of a 
general crisis. To maintain actional legitimacy, organisations should justify what has been omitted 
that is expected by the public and what has been included, which is not expected (Boyd, 2000).  
Therefore, the concept of actional legitimacy is one of the best alternatives to minimising the 
legitimacy gap during a crisis (Boyd, 2000). Not all crisis situations threaten the long term existence 
of organisations, but their policies or strategies and organisational reputations could be threatened 
(Sellnow et al., 2013). Organisations “undertake actional legitimation when they attempt to 
demonstrate the legitimacy not of their entire enterprises, but of specific policies or actions” (Boyd, 
2000. p. 342) and in such cases organisations should take visible actions to address issues before they 
become serious problems for the whole organisation, which could in turn affect organisational 
credibility and then legitimacy. There are four steps in the legitimation process to achieve actional 
legitimacy during or after a crisis (Sellnow et al., 2013; Boyd, 2000): 
 Acknowledging the problem 
 Articulating intent to solve the problem 
 Taking observable action 
 Maintaining an ongoing commitment to issue resolution 
Finally, the actional legitimation process is based on organisational discourse to justify potentially 
challenging situations (Sellnow & Seeger., 2013). In order to diffuse hostility directed at 
organisations, actional legitimacy supports the demonstration of more noble values, ethics, 
accountability and responsibility (Grenberg & Elliott, 2009; Sellnow & Seeger., 2013).  
Thus the concept of actional legitimacy can be used to explain how WFP responded to the wider 
community in response to its crisis in relation to the distribution of rotten food among earthquake 
victims in Nepal. Therefore, the aim of this study is to account the power tensions between WFP and 
other stakeholders including government through their public disclosures, and whether and how WFP 
acknowledges the problem, communicates determination to solve that problem, takes any noticeable 
action and depicts ongoing commitment to maintain actional legitimacy in order to survive as a 
credible humanitarian organisation. 
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4. Methodology  
This study uses thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Attride-Stirling, 2001;  Braun & Clarke, 2006) to 
examine how WFP responded to its crisis in the earthquake affected areas in Nepal. A range of data 
sources were used to support our thematic analysis. All relevant publicly available documents in 
relation to WFP’s crisis, including news media articles, government documents, documents released 
by independent organisations such as National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), and by WFP 
were considered. More specifically, as shown in Table 1, we collected relevant news media articles 
by using the Dow Jones’ FACTIVA database, Nepal governments’ reports, reports and press releases 
by WFP, and   NHRC’s monitoring reports available from April to September, 2015. 
More than one and half dozen daily newspapers are published in the capital city of Nepal, including 
four English dailies: The Kathmandu post, the Himalayan times, The Rising Nepal and Republica.  
By using the FACTIVA database we collected 53 news articles (with 67 pages) from the 25th of April 
2015. We visited WFP’s websites for the same period to review any information related to the crisis, 
including press releases, reports and Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). In total we analyzed 11 
texts (with 14 pages) released by WFP. We also visited WFP’s Twitter account and Facebook 
account to document information on the crisis (see WFP, 2015j & 2015k). Moreover, documents 
published by the government discussing the WFP crisis were reviewed. Primarily, information from 
government bodies (office of Prime Minister and Council Ministers, Constituent Assembly and/or 
Legislature Parliament of Nepal, and Ministry of Agricultural Development) were reviewed. In total, 
12 government documents (264 pages) were reviewed. Reports and texts from the NHRC were 
reviewed (72 pages in total), including a monitoring report (24 pages) regarding similar issues with 
WFP in 2009.  
Overall, we gathered 422 pages for thematic analysis: 67 pages of newspaper articles, 14 pages of 
documents from WFP webpages, 5 pages of information from WFP’s social sites, 72 pages of NHRC 
documents, and 264 pages of documents from government. All of these documents were uploaded to 
analysis software, NVivo, for thematic analysis.  
We used QSR NVivo 101 to support our thematic analysis and followed six different phases as 
suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006): familiarising with data, generating initial codes, searching for 
themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, producing the report.  
 
 
                                                            
1NVivo is a computer program for qualitative data analysis that allows one: to import and code textual data; edit the text; 
retrieve, review and recode coded data; search for combinations of words in the text or patterns in the coding; and import 
from or export data to other quantitative analysis software (Bandara, 2006). 
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 Table 1. Sources of documents for thematic analysis  
Analysis Database Examples of the nature of 
documents reviewed 
Numbe
r of 
docume
nts 
Number of 
pages 
Purpose of analysis
News media 
coverage 
analysis 
Dow-jones FACTIVA 
https://global-factiva-
com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/sb/d
efault.aspx?lnep=hp  
 
The Kathmandu Post, The 
Himalayan Times and Republica 
53  67  They are the primary 
sources for circulating 
information to the people. 
Our purpose is to capture 
how the media shaped 
WPF’s role during the 
crisis.  
Nepal’s 
government 
press release, 
monitoring 
reports, 
publications 
and meeting 
minutes 
Constituent Assembly and/or 
Parliament of Nepal 
(www.can.gov.np) 
Office of Prime Minister (PM) 
and Council ministers 
(www.opmcm.gov.np) 
Ministry of Agricultural 
Development, Department of 
Food Technology and Quality 
Control (www.dftqc.gov.np) 
 
Cabinet decision (5), PM Office 
bulletin (2), Legislature 
parliament’s industry and 
commerce annual report (1), 
Legislature parliament national 
disaster management committees 
monitoring report (3), Ministry of 
Agricultural Development, 
Department of Food Technology 
and Quality Control press release 
(1) 
12 264  To capture the Nepalese 
government’s assessment 
on WFP’s role.  
WFP’s press 
release/news,  
publication 
analysis 
WFP (www.wfp.org ) Press  releases, audio or video 
involving direct communication 
regarding the crisis 
11 14 To document WFP’s 
official disclosures while 
handling the crisis 
WFP’s social 
media analysis 
WFP 
(www.facebook.com/WorldFood
Programme) 
(www.twitter.com/WorldFoodPro
gramme) 
Facebook 
Twitter 
2 5 (All the 
posts related 
to the crisis 
were copied 
to Word) 
To understand the general 
population’s view of the 
crisis 
National 
Human Rights 
Commission 
(NHRC) press 
release and 
monitoring 
report 
NHRC (www.nhrc.org.np)   Monitoring reports, text releases 
and pictures 
3 72  To have NHRC’s 
independent view on the 
issue,  as it is responsible 
for monitoring human 
rights violation in the 
country protecting interest 
of beneficiaries 
Total Pages 422  
 
Similarly, open coding was adopted for the entire document’s text captured in NVivo (Bell & 
Bryman, 2007). Nodings (Bandara, 2006) and codings in NVivo were done twice to ensure reliability 
and consistency in coding. Finally the codes were developed inductively. To avoid potential pitfalls 
when doing thematic analysis, such as unsuccessful data analysis, unconvincing analysis, mismatches 
between the data and analytical claims, mismatches between theory and analytical claims (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006), a second researcher, in addition to the initial analysis, carefully reviewed the overall 
analysis. 
Finally, keeping the four steps of the legitimation process discussed in the theory section in mind, we 
developed three themes based on the set of available materials (422 pages) related to WFP’s crisis: 
stakeholders’ concerns, WFP’s responses to the crisis and observable remedial actions by WFP.  
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5. Analysis and results 
5.1. Narratives of stakeholder concerns 
As summarized in Table 2, narratives of crisis of WFP reported in newspapers basically highlighted 
the different concerns raised by stakeholders: the need for serious investigation into WFP’s 
earthquake response; violation of different national and international principles and standards by 
WFP; lack of pro-activeness, transparency and accountability in WFP’s working mechanism; and its 
huge coordination problems with the government and other local NGOs.  
 
When the issue came to light, national media including television covered it in their headlines with 
pictures and videos of rotten food distributed by WFP.  The issue drew the attention of different 
government bodies including the Prime Minister Office and parliament, human rights organisations 
and other stakeholders (Republica, 2015b).   
Table 2. Summary of narratives of stakeholders’ concerns over WFP’s distribution of rotten food and WFP’s responses 
Thematic 
concerns  
Example quotes References  
Stakeholde
rs’ 
concerns  
 The widespread criticisms in media and social media have drawn strong attention of the government 
which compelled the cabinet meeting at Baluwatar today to look into the matter, and the government 
on Friday directed Ministry of Agriculture Development (MoAD) to investigate the quality of food 
distributed by World Food Program (WFP) to the earthquake victims…… 
 A three-member subcommittee tasked to probe the reports that the WFP distributed inedible 
foodstuffs in Gorkha submitted a report to Speaker Subas Nembang, who heads the parliament's 
Special National Committee for Disaster Management, Monitoring and Direction  
 During its inspection, the NHRC discovered that the rice was of substandard quality and unsuitable 
for consumption….  
  
 The World Food Programme (WFP) officials had distributed substandard rice to the earthquake 
victims in Gorkha even after the local politicians and the officials from the Agriculture Ministry 
notified them about the quality of the rice …. 
 On being asked about the consumption of rice, the local residents said that the rice turned sour, bitter 
and tasteless with bad odour while cooking… 
 The UN body has been reluctant to provide details that would give Nepalis more confidence in its 
handling of relief supplies-for instance, how it stores the supplies, how they are transported and the 
time the supplies take to reach quake-affected areas…. 
 Government officials, however, refute his claim. They instead complained that UN agencies had not 
coordinated with the government and showed highhandedness while importing such humanitarian 
donations…. 
Republica, 2015, June 19 
 
 
 
Sangraoula, 2015, June 
26 
 
The Kathmandu Post, 
2015, May 26 
 
 
The Kathmandu Post, 
2015, June 26 
 
NHRC, 2015 May 26 
 
The Kathmandu Post, 
2015, June 24 
 
 
Republica, 2015, July 11 
WFP’s 
responses 
to the crisis  
 WFP has investigated recent claims about rice in Kabhre district and found no evidence that rice 
distributed was inedible…. 
 WFP takes food quality and safety extremely seriously. We follow up on any reports we receive as a 
matter of priority and investigate each case. WFP's stringent food quality standards are in line with 
the Government of Nepal's regulations. 
 Ging, who was flanked by UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative Jamie 
McGoldrick, reiterated that what WFP distributed through its partners was good food". WFP did not 
supply to any person in this country any substandard food. That is the main factor," he added. “He 
said while arguing that the food that WFP was providing through its national partners was of 
absolutely good quality…. 
WFP, 2015, May 21 
 
WFP, 2015, June 18 
 
 
 
Koirala, 2015, July 1 
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Stakeholde
rs’ 
recommen
dations for 
action 
against 
WFP 
 Constituent Assembly (CA) Chairman Subhash Chandra Nembang said on Tuesday that he would 
make sure that action is taken against the people involved in distributing rotten rice under the banner 
of the WFP…. 
 The NHRC today recommended action against WFP … for distributing substandard rice to 
earthquake victims……. 
 The government on Sunday warned of taking 'sternest possible action' against the offender if the rice 
distributed by the (WFP) to the earthquake victims is found to be of substandard quality…. 
 Meanwhile, Prime Minister's Press Advisor said PMO has put forth the issue to the concerned WFP 
officials. "WFP has communicated to the government that it would investigate the matter and submit 
a report to the government," said Pradhan… 
The Kathmandu Post, 
2015, June 24 
 
The Himalayan Times, 
2015, May 27 
The Kathmandu Post, 
2015, June 21 
 
 
Republica, 2015, July 10 
Demonstra
tion of 
observable 
action by 
WFP 
 We have our clarification ready, which we will submit to the department soon," said Ramji Dahal, 
communication officer at WFP…. 
 The WFP buried eight metric tons of rice on the premise of its warehouse in Gorkha district on 
Monday. .. 
 World Food Programme out of Nepal, the UN food agency has said it will stay by the side of Nepalis, 
"working hand in hand with the government" to support the ongoing recovery efforts… 
Republica, 2015, July 6 
 
Republica, 2015, July 21 
The Kathmandu Post, 
2015, July 4 
 
 
The wider stakeholder concerns over rotten food distribution by WFP (see Table 2) led government’s 
investigation in different levels. The investigation at a government level was not only limited to the 
executives including the Prime Minister Office and ministries, but extended to parliament (also the 
constituent assembly). Parliament then formed monitoring and investigation committees (Sangroula, 
2015a; Legislature Parliament, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) to identify the truth related to this issue by 
monitoring both earthquake regions where damage food was being distributed and also WFP’s 
warehouse at the regional center. The investigation team from parliament was not only made up of 
parliament members but also of experts in the field (The Himalayan Times, 2015b). In addition to the 
government investigating, stakeholders believed it was important for the NHRC2 to become 
involved, the watchdog for human rights, a neutral third party. Table 2 in part highlights different 
stakeholder concerns.  
 
Following investigation by the government and NHRC, the NHRC confirmed that the rice distributed 
by WFP was of substandard quality (the rice turned sour, bitter and tasteless with bad odour) and 
after eating it, the children in the area suffered from diarrhoea and had to undergo treatment (NHRC, 
2015; The Kathmandu Post, 2015a; The Himalayan Times, 2015d; Republica, 2015g). Furthermore, 
a press release from the Ministry of Agricultural Development, Food Technology and Quality 
Control Department (MAD, FTQCD) claimed that the food stored in the Kavre district for 
distribution to earthquake victims was not up to standard and thus instructed district administration to 
prevent WFP from distributing food (Ministry of Agricultural Development, 2015; Dhungana, 2015). 
Likewise, districts’ sub committees under the National Disaster Management, Monitoring and 
Special Direction Committee of Legislature Parliament of Nepal also submitted a report to 
parliament confirming that WFP distributed rotten food (Legislature Parliament, 2015a, 2015b, 
2015c). Similarly, another committee, Industry, Commerce and Consumer Welfare, discussed the 
                                                            
2The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Nepal is an independent and autonomous constitutional body. Established in 
2000 as a statutory body under the Human Rights Commission Act 1997, the Commission was created to protect and promote the 
human rights of the Nepalese people. The Commission can conduct inquiries and investigations, on its own or upon a petition or 
complaint files to it, into the violation of human rights and abetment thereon, and carelessness and negligence in the prevention of 
violations of the human rights by any person, organisation or authority concerned. (http://www.nhrcnepal.org/nhrc_about.html).  
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damaged food distribution by WFP with relevant ministries (Legislature Parliament, 2015d). Another 
monitoring team identified huge amounts of damaged food stored in the WFP warehouse in 
Nepalgunj (The Himalayan Times, 2015b; Republica, 2015f).  
 
There were concerns from stakeholders that WFP was quite reluctant to proactively solve problems 
with transparency and accountability. The parliamentary monitoring report supports this fact, as it 
summarised in its recommendation that WFP was reluctant to provide details about how it stored the 
goods and transported to the beneficiaries (The Kathmandu Post, 2015i); it should have made its 
procurement and distribution process more transparent and coordinated (Sangroula, 2015a). In order 
to prevent the crisis or respond appropriately following the crisis, WFP could have checked the 
quality of food it was being supplied with, and then dealt with other suppliers or proactively 
informed the government and other stakeholders about the issues (see summary in Table 2).  
Stakeholders were really concerned by WFP’s lack of effort to collaborate with others in the 
earthquake affected community (The Kathmandu Post, 2015i, Legislature Parliament, 2015a, 2015b, 
2015c).  
 
In line with Table 2, Table 3 depicts the involvement of different stakeholders when the WFP crisis 
was revealed. The table summarises the roles of different stakeholders in creating pressure on WFP 
to be accountable. While government and human rights NGOs were engaged in providing a critical 
analysis of WFP’s role in solving the crisis, news media’s involvement was to highlight the concerns 
aired by NGOs and the government.  
 
Table 3. Involvement of different stakeholders when WFP’s crisis was revealed.  
Involvement of different stakeholders during crisis Role during crisis Reference
Parliament (also was the Constituent Assembly) Formed different investigation teams including 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to investigate 
issues, asked government to take action regarding 
WFP 
The Kathmandu Post, 22, 24 & 25 June; 
8 & 21 July 2015 
Himalayantimes, 22 June;  17 July 2015 
Republica, 23, 24, 25 & 26 June; 1, 2, 4, 
5,6,10, 11 & 21 July 2015 
Cabinet of Nepal government  Asked different ministries to investigate and ensure 
that action would be taken if  WFP distributed 
substandard foods 
The Kathmandu Post, 21 June 2015 
Republica, 19 June 2015 
Prime Minister Office Asked ministries to identify the truth and follow 
their work 
The Kathmandu Post, 18, 19  20 & 24 
June 2015 
Himalayantimes, 25 June 2015 
Republica,19 & 21 June; 10 July 2015 
Different Ministries and their departments 
(example: Ministry of Commerce and supplies, 
department of food technology and quality control) 
Dealt with WFP in Nepal and through UN 
headquarters, tested samples, banned damage food 
distribution  
The Kathmandu Post, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25 & 26 June; 8, 20 & 21 July 2015 
Himalayantimes, 22 May; 17 & 20 July 
2015 
Republica, 23 May; 19, 21, 23, 25 & 26 
June; 1,5,6, 10,11 & 21 July 2015 
District and local government  Ensured they knew what was being distributed in 
the field and reported this to upper level 
The Kathmandu Post, 2 & 20 July 2015 
Republica, 26 June; 21 July 2015 
Himalayantimes, 19 June; 20 July 2015 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Independent body that investigated issues and 
ensured that people’s rights after the earthquake 
were not violated 
The Kathmandu Post, 26 & 27 May; 25 
June; 8 & 21 July 2015 
Himalayantimes, 27 May 2015 
Republica, 23 & 26 May; 19 & 24 June; 
2,3,4,5 & 11 July 2015 
Consumer rights activists (Consumers' Welfare 
Protection Forum) 
Advocated on behalf of consumers in Nepal for 
their welfare 
The Kathmandu Post, 24 June 2015 
Media, journalists, their association and press Reported on what was happening based on proofs The Kathmandu Post, 3 July 2015 
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union (The Federation of Nepali Journalists (FNJ), 
Nepal Press Union) 
and to ensure nothing was being reported under any 
pressure 
Republica , 2 & 3 July 2015 
Other human rights organisations (Informal Sector 
Service Center (INSEC)), civil society 
INSEC, a Nepal-based human rights organisation, 
to speak for people’s rights 
Republica 26 June; 5 & 21 July 2015  
Other local representatives of political parties  Supported relief distribution The Kathmandu Post, 26 June 2015 
Republica, 23, 25 & 26 June 2015 
Beneficiaries Vulnerable people hit by the earthquake looking for 
support from outside to sustain life, revealed the 
quality of food distributed by WFP 
The Kathmandu Post, 27 May; 18, 19 & 
24 June; 2 July 2015 
Himalayantimes, 26 May 2015 
Republica, 19 & 26 June 2015 
 
5.2 WFP’s responses to the crisis 
 
Under the widespread pressures from stakeholders over the distribution of rotten food among 
earthquake victims, WFP responded. As summarised in Table 2, WFP conducted its own 
investigations, producing disclosures to defend itself and organising press conferences to dominate 
stakeholders, primarily the media and government. WFP press release and news, and newspapers 
both covered the initiation of WFP’s investigation. In contrast to the result of NHRC’s investigation, 
WFP’s investigation in Kabhre region claimed that:  
WFP has investigated recent claim about rice in Kabhre district and found no evidence that 
rice distributed was inedible (WFP, 2015d).  
 
Likewise, the second investigation was done in the Gorkha region and was published in its news on 5 
June 2015 with the conclusion: “investigation in Laprak finds rice is not from the WFP” (WFP, 
2015e). Thus the overall investigation conducted by WFP had very different outcomes to other 
investigations carried out by the government and NHRC. Furthermore, the WFP produced a series of 
disclosures to defend its own position and counter other investigations. To defend stakeholder 
concerns on its in-transparent system, WFP produced Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) regarding 
the crisis on its websites to clarify their practices and transparency: 
WFP shares detailed information about its activities, in writing, twice a week, with the Government of Nepal. 
Meetings between WFP officials and ministries involved in the earthquake response effort take place several times 
every week. The Constituent Assembly Investigation Team visited WFP warehouses in Nepalgunj on 21st June 
and requested information from WFP. Our office in Kathmandu provided detailed documentation the next day on 
WFP procedures, suppliers, implementing partners, quantities and places of distribution to beneficiaries (WFP 
FAQ, 2015). 
 
In response to the allegation of huge amount of damaged food stored in warehouse, WFP claimed 
that it was “not intended for distribution” (WFP, 2015g). To demonstrate its strong coordination with 
government and others, WFP highlighted that they work very closely with the government and ‘local 
partners’, albeit it did not mention anything about coordinating with any identifiable local NGOs. For 
example: 
WFP’s humanitarian response to the 25 April earthquake is carried out in close partnership with the Government 
of Nepal. Working with authorities at the central, district and village levels and with local partners, WFP has to 
date reached over 2 million people with food and other assistance (WFP, 2015h). 
  
 
Our review of existing texts, contrary to WFP’s disclosures, suggests a lack of coordination with 
12 
 
local government, and collaboration with local NGOs in earthquake affected areas, although it may 
have been better coordinated with the central government.  
 
In summary, WFP’s disclosures suggest that the food distributed in Kabhre, where children suffered 
from diarrhoea, was nutritious and edible; and the food distributed in Gorkha was not distributed by 
WFP (WFP, 2015d, 2015e). WFP concluded that the low quality food had reached the earthquake 
region, but was never distributed to earthquake victims (WFP, 2015f); the damaged food remained 
stored in the warehouse and was “not intended for distribution” (WFP, 2015g).  
 
Overall, WFP did not offer much opportunity for stakeholders to make comments on their activities 
either locally or nationally. The disclosures through their FAQs appeared to be one communication 
strategy regarding its accountability to the wider community including national government. As there 
is visible discrepancy between what WFP claimed and what media and other documents reported, it 
should shave shared more information with the government and stakeholders about their actions in 
this crisis to demonstrate greater accountability. By refuting the claims of government investigation, 
not collaborating with the government and other stakeholders, and not providing enough information, 
WFP demonstrated itself as a very powerful entity, arguably behaving more powerful than the 
government in the country where it operates. Thus, WFP appears to exhibit corporate behaviour in 
managing its crisis which supports the neo-liberal ideology that I/NGOs should adopt corporate 
strategy (Kaldor et al., 2003; Baur, 2011).  
 
Finally, WFP used a press conference where it adopted a ‘blaming and threatening’ approach to solve 
the crisis. News media were blamed by WFP for incorrectly reporting what had happened in the field 
and the government was blamed for not cooperating. WFP warned the Nepal government that it 
would withdraw all the support being provided and divert it to other countries (Koirala, 2015; 
Republica, 2015d, 2015e, 2015h). The Director of the UN’s Coordination and Response Division of 
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), John Ging, who is responsible for 
worldwide relief distribution for the UN, on July 2, 2015, slammed the Nepali media for its 
reporting, saying it was all ‘nonsense’ about the sub-standard food being provided by WFP to the 
earthquake victims; he warned Nepal that WFP may pull out its assistance if such criticisms 
continued (Republica, 2015e; Koirala, 2015). The director claimed that “WFP has never supplied 
damage foods and I found no connection between the reports in the media and reality in the field” 
(The Himalayan Times, 2015c), and that the Nepal government officers and media want to spoil 
WFP’s name by saying all this ‘nonsense’ (Koirala, 2015; The Kathmandu Post, 2015c). Criticising 
country’s government and media for investigating events to ensure that their people are safe and have 
quality food,indicates WFP’s lack of accountability to the national government and people where it 
operates.  Hence, the overall approach “leaves no room for an accounting of, affective response to, 
the socially, politically or emotionally elaborated lives of individuals sufferers” (Fredriksen, 2016, p. 
53).  
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Table 4 summarises stakeholders’ allegations against WFP and its disclosure response to the 
allegations.  
Table 4. Summary of WFP responses through disclosures in defence of its position 
 
Major issues/allegations to WFP WFP response Types of response and disclosures 
Distribution of low quality food in the Kavre region. As a 
result many children suffered from diarrhoea. NHRC 
monitored the rice stored at Samaj Sewa building in 
Mahadevsthan and found it to be inedible. The lab report 
showed that the quality of rice was below the criteria set 
by the Nepal government.  
WFP has investigated recent claims about rice in 
Kabhre district and found no evidence that rice 
distributed was inedible. Nepal’s Centre for Quality 
Surveillance (CQS) has tested a sample and found the 
rice was edible and nutritious but had a slightly 
higher percentage of broken rice than the 25 percent 
quality standard. 
 News published on WFP 
websites on 21 May 2015 
 WFP basically defended by 
providing a lab investigation 
report from a different lab 
Distribution of low quality food again in the Gorkha 
region a number of times, even after WFP was informed 
about the quality of food by local and government staff 
…. 
 
WFP investigated the rice distributed in Gorkha and 
claimed that it had not been distributed by WFP. 
 
Later on WFP representatives said that they had 
inspected the consignment delivered to the 
earthquake-affected communities in Laprak and 
found that some of the food items were damaged by 
rain during transport. 
  
WFP further mentioned that they launched 
investigation into the damaged rice. Three potential 
possibilities for being damaged: from supplier, in 
warehouse, or during transport, have been identified.  
 Statement of findings on 5 
June 2015 publication 
followed by news published 
on WFP websites on the same 
date  
 News published on WFP 
website on 18 June 2015 
 
 
  News on WFP websites on 
19 June 2015 
 Overall, WFP rejected that 
damaged food was distributed 
to people, using many 
excuses: damaged food was 
not WFP’s, WFP never 
distributed the damaged food, 
instead they replaced it and 
launched an investigation 
Huge storage of damaged food items in 
godwon/warehouse at regional office of 
WFP….identified by parliamentary monitoring team 
 
The rice stored in the warehouse was not meant for 
distribution, whereas the yellow split peas were sent 
back to the supplier as WFP itself rejected this 
consignment. WFP’s food procurement division at 
Rome cancelled the contract with suppliers. WFP 
bought peas from local suppliers.  
 Statement on yellow split 
peas on 21 June 2015 as a 
publication followed by news 
published on WFP websites 
on the same date. 
 Again WFP defended that 
the huge amount of damaged 
food at the warehouse was not 
meant for distribution 
 
Director of Coordination and Response Division of the 
OCHA, John Ging, on July 2, blamed and slammed the 
Nepali media for reporting against WFP, and threatened 
to withdraw support from Nepal, organising a press 
conference.  
WFP was silent on this issue immediately produced 
disclosures committing to longer service in Nepal.  
 News on WFP websites on 3 
July 2015 with heading ‘WFP 
continues to support the 
people of Nepal’ 
 When WFP press 
conference was condemned by 
all stakeholders, indirectly 
WFP expressed its 
commitment towards Nepal, 
but was silent regarding 
Ging’s speech 
Parliamentary monitoring committee did not receive any 
documents that had been asked for from WFP, who had 
assured they would provide them. Similarly, WFP was 
proscribed from distributing relief materials by Central 
Department of Food Technology and Quality Control 
(government).  
When WFP officials were asked, the WFP head of 
logistics, Franck Aynes, as an example, said the 
necessary documents and information should be taken 
from the communication officer.  
WFP later admitted that it happened due to 
carelessness during the procurement process. 
 
 No written disclosures 
 
Some other issues were raised through social media:  
 Facebook: ‘WFP provided rice but not even 
capable for animal to eat…it’s not the first 
time…go back to history. Western Nepal’, ‘can we 
have public audit of the money raised..’, ‘…we do 
not need you..’  
 Twitter: ‘#GoBackWFP’, can we talk about rotten 
foods you sent as the relief?, ‘Nepal needs help but 
WFP only responded on Facebook twice providing 
news links mentioned above.  
 Facebook response on 25 
May and 17 June 2015, and no 
response at all on Twitter  
 WFP redirected users to see 
their disclosures and many 
cross questions were 
unanswered. 
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don’t think we r begger’, ‘scrutinize ur officer in 
Nepal’ 
 
 
 
5.4. Demonstration of observable actions by WFP 
Our discussion also relates to the demonstration of WFP’s observable actions. Despites WFP’s 
defensive strategies in response to the crisis, they attempted to disclose few observable actions and 
future commitment to working on minimising the effects of their negative reputation, image and 
legitimacy crisis. The WFP destroyed a huge quantity of rotten food, and attempted to send a draft 
letter to the government on the controversy over rotten food (yellow peas) stored in the godown of 
WFP in the Banke district (Republica, 2015i). Even though journalists were barred entering the 
premises while the damaged food was being destroyed, and written clarification also defended that 
the rotten food was never distributed and that the stored damages food in warehouse was not meant 
for distribution (Sapkota, 2015; The Kathmandu Post, 2015k), these actions can be considered 
positive observable actions adopted in the process of managing the crisis. Moreover, when the WFP 
crisis escalated after the speech of the OCHA director, without pausing for a day, it produced 
disclosures mentioning its future commitment to counter the effect of the controversial speech, which 
was strongly condemned by wider stakeholders. It tried to remind stakeholders, via disclosures, that 
it had been in Nepal for more than 50 years assisting the Nepalese community and now it was 
beginning the second phase of rehabilitating people in earthquake regions (WFP, 2015i). In doing so 
WFP appeared to maintain actional legitimacy (Boyd, 2000). However its organizational discourse 
provides the account and justification of potentially controversial situations (Sellnow et al., 2013). 
The approaches taken by WFP at least showed a negligible level of ethics and thus moved one step 
further to re-legitimise its operations by expressing its commitment regain its reputation and image 
by staying at the side of Nepali people. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Having reviewed all publicly available documents and news articles, we attempted to demonstrate 
whether and how a big humanitarian organisation such as WFP either defends its actions or uses 
apologia to repair and maintain legitimacy (Williams & Treadaway, 1992, Boyd, 2000). The study 
found that while WFP adopted a defensive approach and exhibited few observable actions as part of 
an actional legitimation process in the midst of crisis, the demonstration of a future commitment 
contributed to the legitimation process. However, in this process, WFP was seen to undermine 
stakeholders’ voices, behave as very powerful actor and demonstrate a perceived lack of 
accountability in the food distribution channel to the disaster victims. As any disaster affected 
regions’ development or rehabilitation is only possible through better official coordination with local 
government actors, and collaboration with local NGOs and stakeholders, the lack of accountability 
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and coordination during WFP’s disaster response detrimentally affected the immediate development 
and potential future development of earthquake affected areas. 
Legitimacy, organisational disclosure and ethics are intertwined. In the legitimation process, WFP’s 
(non) disclosures appear to have been challenged by stakeholders. From an ethical perspective a few 
questions were raised here: did WFP’s disclosures possess integrity? Are the consequences of its 
narratives positive? Did WFP represent genuine public interests (Cheney & Christensen, 2001; Heath 
et al., 2009)? While legitimacy appeared to be important to WFP, since its existence is based on 
outsiders’ expectations (Seeger, 1986; Heath et al., 2009), it demonstrated a perceived lack of 
accountability and ethics in dealing with the community’s interests, completely contrary to the basic 
principles of humanitarian organisations. In the conclusion we echo with Burt (2007) that more 
research is required to understand NGOs’ accountability but at the sametime we call for further 
research on effective governance and accountability by both NGOs and public sector organisations to 
mitigate any form of natural disaster (Newberry, 2016). 
In terms of limitations, we did not take into account more details on the specific accounting 
instruments (e.g. numbers, indicators) and how those are mobilised by the different parties to 
underline their different positions. Furthermore, secondary documents such as reports and newspaper 
articles cannot necessarily provide the neutral evidence required to establish how the different parties 
(WFP and the Nepali Government and other associated stakeholders) use accounting information to 
underline their respective points of view. Richer insights could be derived by undertaking extensive 
fieldwork, and interviews with senior executives from WFP and the government officials in Nepal.  
This paper is preliminary part of the broader study on NGOs’ accountability practices within the 
context of a developing nation. We hope to provide more insight based on field study in the future.  
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